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UNLEASHING A CURE FOR THE BOTNET ZOMBIE
PLAGUE: CYBERTORTS, COUNTERSTRIKES, AND
PRIVILEGES
T. Luis de Guzman+

In an April 28, 2008, blog post, computer security researchers announced a
startling breakthrough: they had finally discovered a way to battle the Kraken. 1
The researchers had not, however, uncovered a way to slay the mythical sea
monster. 2 This Kraken was a botnet 3-a network of some 400,000 personal
computers that were infected without their owners' knowledge 4 by software
that caused the computers to transmit thousands of unwanted e-mails. 5 By
commanding the infecting network to destroy itself, the researchers would6
have reduced the flow of unwanted e-mails to users all over the Internet.

+ J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A. University of Cambridge; M.Sc. University of London. The author would like to thank
Professor Antonio Perez for his insight and supervision in the writing of this paper. The author is
also grateful to his colleagues at the Catholic University Law Review for their encouragement and
constructive criticism during the preparation of this paper.
1. Kraken Botnet Infiltration, Posting of Pedram Amini to DVLabs Blog,
http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/blog/2008/04/28/kraken-botnet-infiltration (Apr. 28, 2008, 19:03
UTC) [hereinafter Kraken Botnet Infiltration].
2. Id. The "Kraken" is a mythical being believed by Scandinavian sailors to be a manyarmed sea monster, whose arms, "if they were to lay hold of the largest man-of-war ... would
pull it down to the bottom of the sea." 23 ROBERT HAMILTON & WILLIAM JARDINE, THE
NATURALIST'S LIBRARY: MAMMALIA VOL. 8, AMPHIBIOUS CARNIVORA 327-28 (1839).

3. Kraken Botnet Infiltration,supra note 1.
4. Ryan Naraine, Kraken Botnet Infiltration Triggers Ethics Debate, EWEEK.COM, May 1,
2008,
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Kraken-Botnet-Infiltration-Triggers-Ethics-Debate/
(describing Kraken as "a 400,000-strong botnet of infected computers").
5. Kraken Botnet Infiltration, supra note I (describing infected machines on the Kraken
network as "SPAM [unwanted e-mail] delivering zombie[s]").
6. Id. (claiming an ability "to provide an 'update' through the existing Kraken protocol that
can simply remove the Kraken zombie [software]" and describing a process to reverse-engineer
Kraken command-and-control protocol). The researchers uncovered the means by which the
network's creator could command and control thousands of infected computers-in effect, the
researchers were able to impersonate a Kraken command-and-control node. Id. By their own
estimate, the researchers reported that "within a single week [they] would have been able to take
over anywhere from 4% to 14% of the infected population" of computers. Id. Had the
researchers chosen to take control of the Kraken network, they could have instructed the infected
computers to delete the Kraken software. Id.; see also Owning Kraken Zombies, a Detailed
Dissection, Posting of Cody Pierce to DVLabs Blog, http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/blog/2008/
04/28/owning-kraken-zombies (Apr. 28, 2008, 19:13 UTC) [hereinafter Owning Kraken Zombies]
(providing a detailed technical analysis of Kraken botnet command-and-control infrastructure).
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However,
they declined to strike that final blow because they feared legal
7
liability.
This Comment seeks to both address the security researchers' concerns
regarding legal liability as it pertains to defeating botnets and also to supply the
legal means to disrupt botnets by counterattacking individual botnet hosts. To
do so, this Comment first seeks to examine what damage a botnet could do if
used in a cyberattack on an Internet-connected computer system. Then, it asks
whether that damage is a sufficient harm under current tort law to provide a
recovery for its victims. After establishing the liability owed to victims, this
Comment turns to the prospect of holding the individual botnet zombies liable
for the attacks made by botnet masters, because the zombies allowed their
computers to be used by botnet masters in those attacks.
This Comment notes that although a very small minority of jurisdictions
might allow recovery under such a situation, the majority of jurisdictions
would hold that the botnet master's actions were a superseding cause that
extinguished the zombie computer-owner's liability. This Comment suggests
that under a new characterization of an individual computer-owner's duty of
care to other users on a public network, zombie computer-owners could be
held liable for making their computers available to botnet masters for
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Using negligence, rather than
trespass, to determine liability for these attacks allows victims to both
effectively shift costs onto zombies and avoid needlessly artificial pleading.
After establishing the possibility of holding zombie computer-owners liable,
this Comment further advocates the recognition of a legal privilege to allow
DDoS attack victims to make reasonable digital counterstrikes against
individual botnet zombies in order to disrupt the botnet as a whole.
I. ANATOMY OF A BOTNET

Before discussing potential civil liability issues involving botnets, it is
helpful to first have a basic understanding of the technologies involved. A
botnet is a network of computers, usually programmed for some repetitive task,
under a single control mechanism. 8 Although some instances of distributed
computing are composed of willing participants that perform useful work, 9 the

7. Naraine, supra note 4 ("'It's a very tricky situation. What if that end-user system is
performing a critical function? What if that target system is responsible for someone's life
support? ... It really is a moral and a legal quandary."' (quoting interview with David Endler,
Director of Security Research, TippingPoint Technologies, Inc.)).
8. See CRAIG A. SCHILLER ET AL., BOTNETS: THE KILLER WEB APP 31 (2007); TEX.
DEP'T OF INFO. RES., What You Need to Know About Botnets, CYBER SECURITY TIPS, Sept. 2007,
at 1, http://www.dir.state.tx.us/security/reading/Older/200709cybersec.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Folding@home, http://folding.stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2010)
(connecting Interet-connected computers and utilizing user-donated processor time to calculate
protein folding); SETI@home, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) (using
processor time donated by users of Interet-connected computers to process and analyze radio-
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term "botnet" is usually used to refer to networks of computers-zombiesthat have 0been compromised in some way without their operators'
knowledge.'
A botnet affords its master a number of advantages. First, because attacks
are launched from the zombies, which are distributed over a wide variety of
networks and geographical areas, a botnet makes it more difficult to trace
attacks back to the master. 1 Second, the botnet's size increases the potential
volume of malicious traffic that a botnet master can generate.l
Botnets can be used for a number of illicit purposes, including DDoS attacks
and sending unsolicited e-mail (spam). 13 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a
crude but effective way to remotely disrupt an Internet server: essentially, a
DoS overwhelms the target host, rendering it unable to respond to any other
traffic. 14 With enough volume, an attacker can deny those server resources to
telescope data). Unlike the networks described in this Comment, these networks are composed of
computers whose users permit the use of their unused processor time. Malicious botnets may
theoretically be used for similar computationally intensive distributed processing, but as of this
writing, the author is unaware of any non-permissively propagated botnets that are primarily used
for distributed processing.
10. See Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Zombies and Botnets, 333 TRENDS & ISSUES IN
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2007), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/6/8/1/%
7B68151067-B7C2-4DA4-84D2-3BA3B1DABFD3%7Dtandi333.pdf (defining "zombies" and
the greater botnet structure generally). It has been estimated that up to one quarter of all
computers connected to the Internet are in fact botnet zombies. Tim Weber, Criminals 'May
Overwhelm the Web,' BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/lihi/business/62986
41.stm.
11. SCHILLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 30-31 (discussing why it is difficult to track botnet
masters).
12. Botnets of remarkable size have been reported. A recent list of the top eleven botnets in
terms of spain activity estimates that these top eleven account for some 1,370,000 Internetconnected computers. Joe Stewart, Top Spain Botnets Exposed, SECUREWORKS, Apr. 8, 2008,
http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/topbotnets/.
In Stewart's list, the Kraken botnet
(identified by an alternate name, "Bobax") ranks second in spain activity. Id.; see also Kraken
Botnet Infiltration, supra note I (listing alternate names for the Kraken botnet-including
"Bobax"). A single botnet discovered in the Netherlands consisted of 1,500,000 individual
computers. See Gregg Keizer, Dutch Botnet Bigger Than Expected, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct.
21, 2005, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/govemment/showArticle.jhtml?article
ID

=

172303265.

13. See SCHILLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 46-49 (describing various types of botnet DDoS
attacks); id at 51-55 (describing botnet spamming); see also Choo, supra note 10, at 3
(describing use of botnets in DDoS and spam dissemination).
14. See SCHILLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 46-49; United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT), National Cyber Alert System Cyber Security Tip ST04-015:
Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Cyber Security Tip ST04-015]. One such type of DoS attack,
the "SYN flood," involves the automated creation of a series of "half-open" connections with a
server, effectively bombarding the system with requests for information. See CERT, Advisory
CA-1996-21 TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks, http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA1996-21.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter CA-1996-21]. The SYN flood was
described in detail in a paper published in Phrack, a hacker magazine, in 1996. daemon9, route &
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legitimate connections, effectively making the target host inaccessible while
simultaneously taxing the target's processing power.
Faced with a DDoS attack, system administrators can attempt to mitigate
damage and reduce their exposure, by modifying their networks. 16 Some
system administrators, however, have resorted to self-help, taking actions such
as reflecting DoS packets back to their originating computer.' 7 More recently,
software vendors have begun offering 1products promising "graduated
countermeasures" against such cyberthreats. Finally, there are counterattacks
infinity [pseudonyms], IP-spoofing Demystified: (Trust-Relationship Exploitation), 7 PHRACK
MAGAZINE June 1996 at file 14, available at http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=48&id
=14&mode--txt [hereinafter IP-spoofing] (noting that SYN flooding is a step in IP-spoofing); see
also, e.g., Internet Engineering Task Force [IETF], RFC 4987-TCPSYN Flooding Attacks and
Common Mitigations, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4987 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter
RFC 4987] (describing SYN attacks and strategies at combating them).
15. See, e.g., RFC 4987, supra note 14 (describing the methods used by SYN flooding and
their purposes); CA-1996-21, supra note 14 (noting the implications of SYN attacks).
DDoS attacks have been used to harass network users by interfering with their ability to
connect to the Internet. One such instance occurred throughout the months of April and May,
2007, when web servers in the Baltic state of Estonia came under severe, sustained DDoS attacks.
See Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to
Cyberspace,N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at Al. It was widely believed that the Estonian attacks
were launched by Russian-controlled botnets in retaliation for the Estonian government's decision
to remove a Soviet-era war memorial from a prominent position in Tallinn, the Estonian capital.
1d; see also 9th of May, Posting of Mikko to F-Secure Blog, http://www.f-secure.com/weblog
/archives/00001 188.html (May 9, 2007, 12:59 GMT) (purporting to show an image of a Russian
hacker website offering DDoS-attack instructions fashioned particularly for attacking Estonian
websites). At least one ethnic Russian Estonian national was subsequently convicted and fined
for one of the attacks. Mike Sachoff, Man Convicted in Estonia Cyber Attack, WEBPRO NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2008 4:48 PM), http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/01/24/man-convicted-inestonia-cyber-attack.
More recently, some botnet operators have used DDoS attacks as a means of extortion by
'using a botnet to DDoS a computer or a company until a ransom is paid to make the DoS stop."
SCHILLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 60.
U.S. courts have found that sending spam in quantities that place unreasonable burdens on email networks constitutes a type of DDoS attack. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997); see also infra notes 51-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the case brought against spammers under a trespass to chattels theory). The logic
in CompuServe has been applied in a number of subsequent e-mail spam cases. See, e.g., White
Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 2005); Verizon
Online Svcs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 604 (E.D. Va. 2002); Am. Online, Inc. v.
LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp.
2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998).
16. See RFC 4987, supra note 14, at 6-11 (outlining the common defenses to DoS attacks).
17. See Deborah Radcliff, Can You Hack Back?, CNN.CoM, June 1, 2000, http://archives.
cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/06/0 1/hack.back.idg/ (describing retaliatory packet reflection
against DoS attack on World Trade Organization website).
18. See Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking:Digital Counterstrikes
and the Contours of Self-Help, I J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 171, 176-79 (2005) (discussing a
commercially available software package for digital counterattacks). Smith also discusses an
extreme case of self-help, in which an unnamed frustrated system administrator "admitted to

Unleashinga Curefor the Botnet Zombie Plague

2010]

that are designed to disrupt or destroy botnets by attacking their command and

However, such counterstrikes interfere with the
control protocols.' 9
functioning of a zombie computer, which may trigger unforeseen
20
consequences if these measures cause the zombie computer to stop working.

II.

THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL "LANDSCAPE" FOR CYBERATTACKS

The Internet, botnets, and DoS attacks are all relatively recent phenomena,
but the legal doctrines that govern civil liability on the Internet are anything
21
common-law principles of liability continue
Generally,
familiar
but
recent.albeit
circumstances.
to apply,
under changed

A. Trespass to Chattels

The extension of common-law torts to cyberspace has resulted in the
remarkable revitalization of the tort of trespass to chattels. 22 Once thought
moribund, this tort has returned as the primary cause of action after a DoS
Attack."
1. At Common Law: Conversion'sLittle Brother
At common law, the tort of trespass to chattels protects possessory interests
in personal property. 24 The Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the tort's
having resorted, on one occasion, 'to baseball bats' on the theory that '[t]hat's what these punks
will understand."' Id.at 176 n.20 (quoting Winn Schwartau, Striking Back: Corporate Vigilantes
Go On the Offensive to Hunt Down Hackers, NETWORKWORLDFUSION, Jan. 11, 1999,
http://www.networkworld.com/archive/ 999/54697_01-11-1 999.html).
19. See, e.g., Kraken Botnet Infiltration, supra note I (claiming an ability "to provide an
'update' through the existing Kraken protocol that can simply remove the Kraken zombie

[software]").
20. See id (discussing counterstrikes and their possible effects). The researchers who
reverse-engineered the Kraken botnet's communication protocol expressed concern about the
possible consequences of an active counterstrike using vital network-connected computers:
"What happens if we accidentally crash the target system? What if that target system is
responsible for someone's life support?" Id.
21. See Jay C. Carle & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Civil Liability on the Internet, GP SOLO, Jan.Feb. 2006, at 45-47; infra Part III.A-C.
22. See Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 358-59 (4th Cir.
2006) (noting that plaintiffs claims rely in part on the common-law tort of conversion, which has
not been recognized in Oklahoma); Intel Corp. v. Hamdi, 71 P.3d 296, 302-08 (Cal. 2003)
(discussing the evolution of trespass to chattels-which requires proof of actual harm-and its
application to actions based in computer use).
23. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that
trespass to chattels had not been used often in California but can be applied to conduct involving
computer technology).
24. See id.(noting that the primary function at common law was to protect an owner from
being dispossessed of his property); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 14 (5th ed. 1984). "[I]t is a trespass to damage goods or destroy them, to make
an unpermitted use of them, or to move them from one place to another." Id.
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three elements: intent, 25 interference with the chattel, 26 and actual harm.27 In
an oft-quoted28 passage, Dean William Lloyd Prosser, editor of Prosser on
Torts, dismissed the tort's relative importance, noting that "[t]respass
to
29
chattels survives today.., largely as a little brother of conversion."
2. Resurrection as a Cause ofAction for Network Torts

Following the publication of the fifth edition of Prosser's treatise,30 the tort
of trespass to chattels began to crawl out from under the shadow of its bigger
brother, conversion, and come into its own as a cause of action in cases
involving interferences with computers and computer networks.
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, the California Court of Appeals applied

trespass to chattels to an early computer-hacking case. 31 The plaintiff, Thrifty-

25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note
24, at § 14 (noting that trespass to chattels is "exclusively a wrong of intentional interference").
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (noting that "using or intermeddling with
a chattel in the possession of another" constitutes trespass to chattel).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218. Section 218 reads:
One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of the
chattel if, but only if,
(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in
which the possessor has a legally protected interest.
Id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at § 14 (noting the "necessity of some actual damage
to the chattel before the action can be maintained").
28. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302 (Cal. 2003); Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
473.
29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at § 14. Prosser notes that with the emergence of
conversion as a cause of action for total dispossession of a chattel, trespass to chattels faded as a
cause of action. Id. Trespass to chattels's "chief importance now is that there may be recovery
where trespass would lie at common law, for interferences with the possession of chattels which
are not sufficiently important to be classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay
the full value of the thing interfered." Id.
30. The fifth edition of Prosser and Keeton's treatise was published in 1984. KEETON ET
AL., supra note 24. Coincidentally, the influential hacker magazine 2600 (now 2600: The Hacker
Quarterly) began publication in January of that year. 2600: THE HACKER QUARTERLY (1984
Archive), http://store.2600.com/1984.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
Phrack, another
influential hacker magazine, began publication the following year. PHRACK MAGAZINE, Phrack
Issues, http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue: I (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
31. Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. The court noted that trespass to chattels was then
"seldom employed as a tort theory in California." Id.at 473. The defendants in Thrifty-Tel were
engaged in "phone phreaking," a type of hacking that specializes in attacks on the phone system
itself. See LAWRENCE E. BASSHAM & W. TIMOTHY POLK, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., THREAT ASSESSMENT OF MALICIOUS CODE AND HUMAN THREATS, 1994, http://csrc.nist.
gov/publications/nistir/threats/subsection3_43.html.
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Tel, was a long-distance telephone carrier. 32 The defendants' two teenage sons
managed to obtain a code that enabled them to use Thrifty-Tel's long-distance
services without paying for them.33 The boys subsequently began to use their
computer and modem to dial Thrifty-Tel's network repeatedly, 34 randomly
trying combinations of numbers in an effort to find other authorization
codes.
36
The automated dialing overwhelmed Thrifty-Tel's telephone lines.
Thrifty-Tel brought an action for conversion, 37 not only of the six-digit
authorization codes that the teenagers had used to make long-distance
telephone calls, 38 but also for the "tie-up" of its telephone system. 39 The court
declined to decide whether the use of the six-digit authorization codes
constituted conversion.
The court held that "the evidence supports the
verdict on a trespass theory. 41 Noting that trespass to chattels includes the
unauthorized use of personal property, 42 the court held that repeated,
32. Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
33. Id. In order to place long-distance telephone calls on Thrifty-Tel's network, a
subscriber would first have dialed a "confidential access code," followed by a "six-digit
authorization code." Id. The Bezenek boys obtained their first "confidential access code" from a
friend. Id.
34. Id. By using their computer to automate the dialing process, the Bezenek boys were
engaging in a variation of "wardialing." See MICHAEL GUNN, SANS INSTITUTE WHITE PAPER
NO. 268, WAR DIALING 2 (June 9, 2006), http://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/testing
/268.php (defining the term "wardialing"). The technique gets its name from the 1983 film War
Games, in which a teenage hacker employing the technique accidentally dials an advanced
defense computer. Id.at 1.
35. Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. The boys succeeded on several occasions,
discovering access codes that they then used to make over thirteen hundred long-distance
telephone calls. Id.
36. Id. (finding that the boys' repeated dialing "overburdened the system, denying some
[Thrifty-Tel] subscribers access to phones [sic] lines"). This is a classic "denial of service": the
defendants' computer was repeatedly dialing Thrifty-Tel, therefore many of Thrifty-Tel's
subscribers could not connect to Thrifty-Tel's telephone network. Id.
37. Id. Thrifty-Tel also brought actions against the two boys for fraud, alleging that the
boys had misrepresented themselves as legitimate users of the long-distance network. Id.at 473.
38. Id.at 472.
39. Id.
40. Id. (declining to resolve the question on the conversion of intangible property). The
court noted that the question of whether intangible property, such as computer access codes,
could be the subject of conversion "present[ed] an issue of first impression in California and
apparently most everywhere else as well." Id.;
cf CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting "extremely meager" common law of trespass
to chattels in Ohio).
41. Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. The court noted that "[c]ourts have traditionally
refused to recognize as conversion the unauthorized taking of intangible interests that are not
merged with, or reflected in, something tangible." Id. Because the access codes were never
"reduced to paper or reflected on a computer disk," the court found that a conversion action could
not be sustained. Id.
42. Id. at 473. Although the court acknowledged that to find a defendant liable for trespass
to chattels, he must have physically interfered with a chattel, it also explained that this
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computer-scripted calls were an "intermeddling" with Thrifty-Tel's telephone
network.43 The defendants' repeated 44dialing was "sufficiently tangible" to
support a finding of trespass to chattels.
a. The Spam Cases: Protectingan Interest in the Functioningof
ComputerNetworks
Thrifty-Tel involved the traditional telephone network, but its logic can be
applied to DoS attacks on the Internet. The first set of Internet trespass-tochattels cases was brought against spammers, whose unsolicited e-mails began
to flood Internet users' mailboxes in the 1990s, taxing the resources of Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). 45 The Intemet-spam cases are one step removed
from the repeated direct dialing in Thrifty-Tel.46 Nevertheless, in determining
whether such actions constitute an actionable trespass to chattels, courts have
looked to 47the effect on the functionality of the plaintiffs computer
equipment.
i. Compuserve: Spam as Trespass to Chattels
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. was an early Internet-span
case,48 and has been the foundation for a number of subsequent cases involving
requirement had been significantly relaxed, noting that electronic signals were "sufficiently
tangible to support a trespass cause of action." Id. at 473 n.6. The court's decision began to blur
the difference between tangible and intangible intermeddling, shifting the focus of inquiry from
whether a defendant interfered with a chattel to the nature of the alleged interference. Id. at 473.
43. Id. (quoting Zaslow v. Kroenert, 175 P.2d 1, 7 ("Where the conduct complained of...
consists of intermeddling with or use of ... the personal property, the owner has a cause of action
for trespass .... ")); see also id. at 453 n.8 (noting the definition of trespass to chattels found in
the Second Restatement of Torts).
44. Id. at 473 n.3.
45. See, e.g., Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606-07 (E.D. Va.
2002) (noting that defendants were being sued for sending spain). By broad consensus, the term
"spam" is thought to have originated in a comedy sketch first performed on the BBC television
program Monty Python's Flying Circus. Id. at 606 n. I (citing JOHN CLEESE ET AL., 2 MONTY
PYTHON'S FLYING CIRCUS: JUST THE WORDS 27-29 (Methuen 1989)). In the sketch, a customer
at a cafeteria attempts to order a breakfast that does not include the famous canned meat product,
but his protests are drowned out by the waitress's constant, repetitive offerings of very spamheavy breakfasts, such as "spam, egg, spam, spam, bacon and spam." CLEESE ET AL., supra, at
27-28.
46. Compare Verizon Online Servs., 203 F. Supp. 2d at 604-06, with Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 471. In the spam cases, the offending electrons are not sent directly, as were the
telephone calls from the teenagers' computer to Thrifty-Tel's switching equipment, but rather,
they arrive in the form of many unsolicited electronic messages, routed by a variety of means to
their ultimate destinations on ISP mail servers. Verizon Online Servs., 203 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
47. See, e.g., America Online v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(finding that the requirement of impairment for trespass to chattels is met when the spain drains
operating power from a plaintiffs computers).
48. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio
1997). The Internet was so new when CompuServe was decided that the court included a number
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claims against spammers under a trespass-to-chattels theory.49 In CompuServe,
the defendant, Cyber Promotions, Inc., sent a "substantial volume" of spain to
CompuServe's subscribers, and CompuServe sought an injunction 50to prevent
Cyber Promotions from sending any more e-mails to its subscribers.
Relying on the definition and commentary laid out in the Second
Restatement of Torts, the court first addressed the element of
"intermeddling." 5 1 Based on the logic in Thrifty-Tel, the court held that e-mail
messages were enough of an intermeddling to support a trespass-to-chattels
claim. The court went on to hold that the "possession" element was clearly
met. 53 Finally, the court found that there was sufficient intent, noting that
although e-mails can reach a destination by varying paths, the defendants
"affirmatively directed" their e-mails to CompuServe's computers.54
The defendants argued that a cause of action in trespass to chattels should
not lie "[u]nless an alleged trespasser actually takes physical custody of the
property or physically damages it." 55 Again relying on Thrifty-Tel, the court
held that physical dispossession was not necessary to maintain a trespass-tochattels claim. 56 The court found that physical harm to the chattel was
unnecessary, reasoning that damage to the "quality, condition, or value" of a
chattel would be enough to sustain an action. In finding for CompuServe, the
court focused on the way that Cyber Promotions's spain denied CompuServe's
subscribers access to its computers.
The court acknowledged the
"tremendous burden" that processing spain had placed on CompuServe's

of findings of fact defining the Internet itself, drawn from a contemporaneous case. Id. at 101718 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enumerating findings of
fact regarding structure of Internet)).
49. See, e.g., White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 37778 & n.24 (5th Cir. 2005); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va.
2002); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v.
IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
50. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1017, 1020.
51. Id. at 1020-21 (quoting Second Restatement of Torts § 217 cmt. e, which defines
intermeddling as "intentionally bringing about a physical contact with a chattel"). The court
noted that precedent in Ohio was "extremely meager" for trespass to chattels and therefore it was
appropriate to look to the Second Restatement of Torts. Id.at 1021.
52. Id. (noting electronic signals are "sufficiently physically tangible to support a trespass
cause of action").
53. Id. (finding that it was "undisputed" that CompuServe had "a possessory interest in its
computer systems").
54. Id The court did acknowledge, however, that "electronic messages may travel over the
Internet over various routes." Id.
55. Id. at 1022.
56. Id.(citing Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996)).
57. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b) (1965)).
58. Id. ("[Any value CompuServe realizes from its computer equipment is wholly derived
from the extent to which that equipment can serve its subscriber base.").
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equipment, 59 and held that the value of CompuServe's computer equipment
60
had been impaired, as it was made unavailable to CompuServe's subscribers.
ii. Hamidi: Limiting ConsequentialDamages

By adapting the reasoning in Thrifty-Tel to e-mail, CompuServe allowed
civil recovery for victims of span. 61 The extent to which a plaintiff might
recover from a spammer was, however, still unclear. Was recovery limited
only to acts that placed such a "tremendous burden" on computer systems as to
damage their "quality, condition or value"? 62 Or, could a plaintiff also recover
for the consequential damage done to such intangible interests as "business
reputation and goodwill" by a spammer's use of a plaintiffs computer
systems? 63
In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court concluded that
trespass to chattels "does not encompass, and should not be extended to
encompass, an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient
computer system nor impairs its functioning." 64 In Hamidi, the defendant, a
former Intel employee, sent six mass e-mails to some 35,000 of Intel's current
employees. 65 These e-mails were extremely critical of Intel's personnel66
practices, and urged Intel employees to consider moving to other companies.
However, there was no evidence that these e-mails either damaged any Intel
computers or slowed their functioning. 67 Because Intel could not point to any
or networks, the court held that Intel was not entitled
damage to its computers
to summary judgment. 68

59. Id. (noting that excessive amounts of spain "demand[ed] disk space and drain[ed] the
processing power of [CompuServe's] computer equipment").
60. Id. In addition to the "tremendous burden" that Cyber Promotions' spain had placed on
CompuServe's computer equipment, the CompuServe court noted a number of other
consequential harms-the cost of dealing with an increasing number of subscriber complaints
about spain and the termination of subscriber "accounts specifically because of the unwanted
receipt of bulk e-mail messages." Id.at 1022-23. In finding for CompuServe, the court held that
these losses, "insofar as they harm [CompuServe's] business reputation and goodwill with its
customers," would themselves be actionable trespasses. Id. at 1023. But see Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 311 (Cal. 2003).
61. CompuServe, 462 F. Supp. at 1021-22, 1028.
62. Id.at 1022 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b)).
63. Id.at 1023.
64. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300.
65. Id.at 301.

66.

Id

67.
68.

Id.
Id.at 311.
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iii. Beyond Spam: eBay and UnreasonableServer Load
Although CompuServe's tort action was based on the burden that spain
placed on the ISP's servers, 69 its reasoning was not limited only to cases
involving spammers. In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., the same DoS logic
of CompuServe was extended to cover repeated scripted access to a website.70
In eBay, the well-known online auction site sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent Bidder's Edge (BE), an aggregator of auction information, from using
automated "robots" that repeatedly downloaded auction information from
eBay's servers up to 100,000 times a day. 71 The robots' continuous downloads
placed a considerable load on eBay's servers.72 Although eBay initially
permitted BE to use its robots to search for a limited number
of items, 73 BE
74
downloads.
robots'
its
of
frequency
the
began to increase
Despite several communications from eBay requesting that they cease
posting eBay auction listings, BE continued to do so, programming its robots
to search eBay's database continuously.75 Even when eBay attempted to block
76
BE's robots from accessing its site, BE attempted to evade these measures.
The court, ruling on eBay's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, found
that although eBay allowed the public to access its servers, BE's robots
"exceeded the scope of any such consent" and therefore BE's actions
constituted an actionable trespass.77 The court then turned to the question of
damages, and found that BE's repeated robotic searches consumed server

69. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
70. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
71. Id. at 1060-63.
72. Id. BE's information requests accounted for somewhere between 1.11% and 1.53% of
eBay's total daily requests for information and between 0.70% and 1.10% of all the data
transferred by eBay's servers. Id. These figures seem low until one realizes that they account for
traffic generated by a single entity at a time when eBay claimed to have some seven million
registered users. Id. at 1060. Put another way, if we assume that each of eBay's seven million
users accounted for an equal share of eBay's total traffic, a single entity like BE might account
for .0000143% of total traffic. Instead, BE was consuming nearly seven thousand times its
notional proportional share of eBay's traffic.
73. Id. at 1062. eBay initially permitted BE's robots to gather information only on auctions
for Beanie Babies and Furbies. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1062-63.
76. Id. eBay attempted to filter access by IP address; information requests originating from
addresses believed to be BE's were ignored. Id. BE attempted to evade detection by redirecting
its robot traffic through a rotating series of remote proxy servers. Id. BE's use of proxies made it
difficult to trace the robot activity to its originating IP address. Id at 1061.
77. Id. at 1070 (finding that the use of automatic web-crawling robots on a publicly
accessible site, where automated access is prohibited, exceeds the scope of consent and may be an
actionable trespass to chattels).
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resources-"necessarily
compromising eBay's ability to use that capacity for
78
its own purposes."
B. Negligence
Just as courts have extended an ancient cause of action-trespass to

chattels-to new circumstances, the common law of negligence can be
extended to govern the liability of individual zombies for botnet attacks.
Unlike the intentional misconduct of eBay and CompuServe,79 the owners of
zombie computers are not committing intentional torts. They are, however,
negligent in carelessly permitting their computers to cause harm to other
computers. Nonetheless, the common law does allow for recovery based on
an actor's negligence coupled
with a third party's malfeasance-which results
in liability for both actors. 81
1. Palsgraf: Two Views of the Unexpected Plaintiff
The case of Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co. serves as an excellent

example of the two basic analytical frameworks used by courts in dealing with
the problem of the unanticipated plaintiff.82 The plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf, was
standing on a train platform as a train pulled into the station and two men
78. Id at 1071 (quoting CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997)). The court held that the unreasonable consumption of server resources
was an actionable trespass, even without a showing of actual damage to the server hardware itself.
Id.
79. Id. at 1070-71; CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021.
80. If the owner of a zombie computer is not aware that his computer is being used to carry
out a trespass to chattels, he cannot be said to have the intent to commit the trespass. Thus, in
order to find the zombie liable, it is necessary to look to whether the zombie's actions could be in
any way negligent. See Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew Yarborough, Suing the Insecure? A
Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11, 14 (2002) (positing that zombies may be
negligent because they are "knowingly insecure in the face of a well-known threat").
81. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at § 14 (explaining that, at common law, trespass to
chattels may lie both for "direct and forcible" interferences as well as "on the case," but dismissed
the distinction as "artificial"). Actions "on the case" (sometimes merely "case") at common law
were distinct from trespass; trespass required that the plaintiff plead a direct interference "vi et
armis" ("by or with force and arms"), while actions on the case did not. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1703-04 (9th ed. 2009); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77106 (1881); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
359, 361-70 (1951) (describing the history of writs of trespass, case, and negligence). Because
the harm to botnet victims is not a result of a direct act of the zombie, a revival of "case" as a
form of action might allow courts to impose liability on botnet zombies. The resurrection of
trespass to chattels in the cybertort context discussed above shows us that mere antiquity has not
prevented these ancient writs from being reincarnated in surprising new contexts. See supra Part
II.A.2. However, as argued more fully below, modem negligence doctrine provides us with a
better, more readily adaptable tool to deal with unreasonable uses of computer networks. See
infra Part IV.A.
82. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928); see KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 24, at § 43 (characterizing Palsgrafasinvolving an "unforeseeable plaintiff').
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rushed forward to board it. 83 As a railroad employee on the moving train
helped one of the men climb aboard, he dislodged an unmarked package that
contained fireworks.8 4 After the package fell onto the tracks, it exploded and
the resulting concussion knocked a set of luggage scales onto Mrs. Palsgraf,
injuring her. 85
Writing for the majority, Justice Benjamin Cardozo did not find the railroad
company liable to Mrs. Palsgraf.8 6 He noted that "[n]egligence is not
actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the
violation of a right,"8 7 and stressed that rights are created by legal duties to
particular persons. 8 In characterizing Mrs. Palsgraf's suit as an attempt to act
as the "vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another,"8 9 Justice Cardozo
implied that although the railroad might have owed a duty of care to the two
men clambering onto the train, they owed no such duty to Mrs. Palsgraf.90
According to Justice Cardozo, negligence "is ... a term of relation," 91 and a
finding of liability in negligence must necessarily arise from a breach of a duty
owed to the particular plaintiff
himself because "'[p]roof of negligence in the
92
air, so to speak, will not do.'
In his dissent, Justice William Shankland Andrews, rejected the majority's
duty-based conception of negligence, 93 and instead advanced a more pervasive
conception of negligence:
83.
84.

Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99.
Id.

85. id. Subsequent investigations seem to indicate that the cause of the falling scales was
the fleeing crowd, rather than any explosive concussion.
[I]t is very probable, in line with the original theory of the plaintiff's complaint, that the
scale was in fact knocked over by the stampede of frightened passengers. There was an
appreciable interval after the "ball of fire" before the "scale blew." With the explosion
occurring in the pit between the platform and the train, or under the wheels, it is
difficult to see how the scales would not be completely protected from it. Although the
platform was crowded, there is no indication in the RECORD that any other damage
whatever was done by the explosion itself.
William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1953) (internal citations
omitted). Whether the "scale blew" from the force of the explosion or the commotion of the
fleeing passengers, the proximate causation analysis does not change, Id. at 3-4.
86. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99.
87.

Id.

88. Id. at 99-100.
89. Id. at 100. In characterizing Mrs. Palsgraf's suit as an attempt to act as the "vicarious
beneficiary of a breach of duty to another," Justice Cardozo employed the language of contractual
privity and standing to bolster his conception of proximate cause as a duty owed to a particular
plaintiff. Id.
90. Id. at 99.
91. Id. at 101.
92. Id. at 99 (internal citation omitted) (holding that a "victim does not sue derivatively, or
by right of subrogation," but rather for "breach of a duty owing to [the victim] himself").
93. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (rejecting the proposition that negligence involves a
breach of a duty of care to a particular plaintiff as "too narrow a conception").
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Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such
an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might
reasonably be expected to result, but also he who is in fact injured,
even 94if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger
zone.

Instead of looking to a right/duty relationship that would give rise to a
remedy, Justice Andrews focused on the action of the individual actorwhether an actor's action "[u]nreasonably jeopardized the safety of any one
who might be affected by it." 95 The difference between Justice Cardozo's
majority opinion-conceiving proximate cause as an inquiry about correlative
rights and duties-and Justice Andrews's dissent-focusing instead on the
reasonableness of holding the actor liable-still remains; it particularly persists
in cases involving the negligence liability of defendants for the intentional acts
of third parties.96
2. "ParkedCar" Cases
One such example involves parked, unlocked cars. 97 In each case, the
defendant parks his car on the street, leaving the doors unlocked and the keys
in the ignition. 98 Along comes a thief, who steals the car; and as the thief is
driving the car, he injures the plaintiff.99 In each case, the plaintiff brought an
action for negligence against the owner of the stolen car.100

94. Id.at 103.
95. Id.at 104.
96. Compare Hampton by Hampton v. Federal Exp. Corp., 917 F.2d 1119, 1120, 1124-25
(8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing under the Palsgrafmajority, that because defendant had no
knowledge of the plaintiff and could not reasonably foresee any injury, he could not be held
liable), and Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 711, 721-22 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1964)
(following the majority in Palsgrafandfinding that the ship owner and the wharfinger had a duty
of care to "all within the reach of the ship's known destructive power"), with Alvarado v. Sersch,
662 N.W.2d 350, 352-53 (Wis. 2003) (noting that the minority view in Palsgrafhas long been
followed in Wisconsin), and Gritzner v. Michael R., 661 N.W.2d 906, 910, 912 (Wis. 2000)
(adhering to the minority view in Palsgrafandfinding no duty of care).
97. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at § 44 (providing background for this fact
scenario).
98. See, e.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Richards v. Stanley, 271
P.2d 23, 25 (Cal. 1954); Mellish v. Cooney 183 A.2d 753, 753 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962); Maloney v.
Kaplan, 135 N.E. 838, 839 (N.Y. 1922); Ross v. Nutt, 203 N.E.2d 118, 119 (Ohio 1964); Liney v.
Chestnut Motors, Inc., 218 A.2d 336, 337 (Pa. 1966); McClenahan v. Cooley 806 S.W.2d 767,
769 (Tenn. 1991).
99. See, e.g., Hartman, 139 F.2d at 14; Richards, 271 P.2d at 24; Mellish, 183 A.2d at 753;
Nutt, 203 N.E.2d at 120; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337; McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at 769.
100. See, e.g., Hartman, 139 F.2d at 14; Richards, 271 P.2d at 25; Mellish, 183 A.2d at 753;
Nutt, 203 N.E.2d at 120; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337; McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at 769.
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a. Majority View: No Duty Owed to the Unexpected Plaintiff
On the facts above, a majority of jurisdictions would find no liability for the
car owner. 10 1 Some courts have relied on the inability of the defendant to
foresee the (in)competence of a thief to control a car, 10 2 while other courts
have relied on the absence of a duty to control third persons.' 0 3 The question
in these cases, however, is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
to prevent the theft of his car. Under either theory, the act of a third-party thief
could serve to cut the chain of liability to the defendant-because the thief's
actions were unforeseeable, because there was no duty to control the actions of
the thief, or because the thief s actions were an "intervening efficient cause"
sequence" between the defendant's negligence and
that disrupted an "unbroken
04
the plaintiffs harm.'
b. Minority View: Liabilityfor a Defendant-CreatedHazard
A substantial and "growing" minority of jurisdictions would find the
be stolen. 10 5
defendant liable for the hazard he created in permitting his car to
In Mellish v. Cooney, the defendant had parked his car on the street, after dark,
with the keys in the ignition. 1° 6 The Connecticut trial court found the
defendant liable because he "should have foreseen the distinct possibility that a
thief might steal the car and cause damage to innocent persons."' 7 The court
reasoned that the owner of a dangerous object "capable . . . of doing injury"
should be liable for the injuries suffered by third persons if the owner
08
negligently leaves the dangerous object "unguarded and exposed."'
Likewise, in Ross v. Hartman, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that, depending on the circumstances, leaving
a car unlocked might be enough to support a finding of negligence in the event
of harm to a third person. 10 9 Additionally, in Maloney v. Kaplan, the New
York Court of Appeals held that if the defendant is negligent in leaving his car
unsecured, and as a result an injury is suffered that would not have occurred

101. See Richards, 271 P.2d at 29; Nut, 203 N.E.2d at 121; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337.
102. See Richards, 271 P.2d at 25 (finding that "[e]ven if [the defendant] should have
foreseen the theft, she had no reason to believe that the thief would be an incompetent driver");
Nutt, 203 N.E.2d at 121 (holding it to be "beyond the realm of reason to attach liability to an
owner for acts of a nonpermissive user, a thief'); Liney, 218 A.2d at 337 (reasoning that
defendant could not be "on notice that the thief would be an incompetent or careless driver").
103. Richards, 217 P.2d at 27 (noting that, absent some special relationship, "there is no duty
to control the conduct of at third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another").
104. See Richards, 271 P.2d at 27-29; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337.
105. See McClenahan,806 S.W.2d at 774.
106. Mellish v. Cooney, 183 A.2d 753, 753 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962).
107. Id. at 754.
108. Id. at 753.
109. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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0
but for the fact that the car was unsecured, then the defendant is liable."
Thus, the question for the trier of fact is whether the alleged negligence of the
defendant created the hazard that made it possible for a third party to harm the
plaintiff.

C. Privileges to Interfere with Chattels
If the common-law doctrines of trespass and negligence can determine

liability in cyberspace, common-law privileges can likewise be extended to
shield actors from liability for those cybertorts. Victims of botnet DDoS
attacks can attempt to strike back against individual zombies in an effort to
disrupt the botnet, limiting the damage caused by that attack. However, any
counterstrike by the DDoS victim would necessarily entail actions that could
otherwise be found tortious. 1 1 In order to avoid liability for a counterstrike
against a zombie, a DDoS victim would have to operate within a recognized
privilege.
1. Defense of Chattels
The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes a privilege to interfere with the

chattels of another in order to defend one's own chattels.1 12 The privilege
essentially has two elements: (1) that the actor reasonably believes the action
necessary to protect his interest in the possession of his chattel; and (2) that the
harm he inflicts protecting his property be "not unreasonable" in light of the
harm threatened. 13
The court in CompuServe noted that "'[s]ufficient legal protection of the
possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his
privilege to use reasonable
force to protect his possession against even
14
harmless interference."1

110. Maloney v. Kaplan, 135 N.E. 838, 839 (N.Y. 1922); cf Stagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52
F.3d 463, 473-74 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying New York law and holding that "'[w]hen ... the
intervening act is a natural and foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by the
defendant, liability will subsist"' (quoting Kush v. City of Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y.
1983))).
Ill. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio
1997). A counterstrike may be tortious as a trespass to chattels as understood by the cybertrespass cases, or as cybernuisance, or even under the negligence theory advocated in this
Comment.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260(1) (1965). The Restatement reads:
one is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a
conversion if the act is, or is reasonably believed to be, necessary to protect the actor's
land or chattels or his possession of them, and the harm inflicted is not unreasonable as
compared with the harm threatened.
Id.
113. Id.
114. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 218
cmt. e (1965)).
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a. Bad Dogs andReasonableMen
Whether an action is "not unreasonable" in light of the harm threatened is,
necessarily, a question of fact." l 5 However, a line of cases involving
trespassing dogs can at least trace the broad outlines of the privilege. In Hull v.
Scruggs, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the defendant was acting
reasonably when he shot a trespassing dog.116 The dog had habitually entered
the defendant's farm, disturbed his turkeys, and was in the habit of sucking on
their eggs. 1t 7 The court held that the defendant, having attempted to pursue
other means," 8 was reasonable in shooting and killing the dog, in light of the
continuing nature of the violation of the defendant's property interests.' 19
Similarly, in McChesney v. Wilson, a trespassing dog was shot after he
20
"almost daily ... kill[ed] and destroy[ed the defendant's] domestic fowls."'
In this case as well, the killing of the dog was found to be reasonable, in light
of the frequent and ongoing violations of the defendant's property interests.
2. Abatement of Nuisance
The Second Restatement of Torts also recognizes a privilege "to commit an
act which would otherwise be a trespass to the chattel of another" in order to
abate a nuisance. 22 Here again, the privilege is limited to "reasonable means
of abating the nuisance."' 23
An early example of an actor asserting such a privilege may be found in the
left hisfrom
cart
Slater,
the plaintiff
Swann. 124 In
of Slater
old
the had
defendant
preventing
door,
front
of the v.defendant's
horse incase
and English

115. See, e.g., McChesney v. Wilson, 93 N.W. 627, 628 (Mich. 1903); Hubbard v. Preston,
51 N.W. 209, 210 (Mich. 1892); Slater v. Swann, (1865) 93 Eng. Rep. 906, 907 (K.B.).
116. Hull v. Scruggs, 2 So. 2d 543, 544 (Miss. 1941).
117. Id at 543. Evidently, egg-sucking dogs were common enough in Mississippi that the
court felt obliged to take judicial notice of them, declaring: "It is a fact of common knowledge
that when a dog has once acquired the habit of egg-sucking there is no available way by which he
may be broken of it, and that there is no calculable limit to his appetite in the indulgence of the
habitual propensity." Id.
118. Idat544.
119. Id. In finding for the defendant, the court focused on the dog's "habitual depredation"
of the defendant's turkeys. Id. The offending dog "sucked all the eggs which were laid by the
turkeys and guineas ... and ...his presence there was of sufficient frequency or continuity ...
that none of the eggs were left until after the dog was killed." Id.at 543. Note that the dog had
effectively denied the defendant of the benefit of the eggs laid by defendant's fowl; it is also
worth noting that the court stressed the interference with the chattels over the trespass to the
defendant's farm. Id. at 543-44.
120. McChesney, 93 N.W. at 627-28.
121. Id.(focusing on the dog's attack on the farmer's poultry-his personal property-and
not on the dog's mere entry upon the farmer's real property).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 264 (1965).
123. Id.
124. Slater v. Swann, (1865) 93 Eng. Rep. 906, 907 (K.B.).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 59:527

receiving any deliveries. 125 The defendant "therefore ... whipt the horse to
remove the cart," but did "so violently beat the horse, that the plaintiff was
deprived of the use of his cart and horse for several days."' 126 The trial court
left to the jury the question of whether the defendant beat the horse
"immoderately." 127 Thus, the court found that although the defendant was
privileged to remove the cart
from his door, the scope of that privilege was a
128
question of fact for the jury.
Likewise, in Hubbard v. Preston, another "naughty dog" case, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that a landowner was not liable for shooting the plaintiffs
dog, which often gathered with several other dogs near the defendant's house
at night, "seriously annoy[ing]" his family. 12 9 The court held that because the
defendant "had a right to protect his family from such [a] nuisance,"
it was
1 30
proper for a jury to decide whether his actions were reasonable.
In Maryland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Ruth, the defendant was found
not liable to the plaintiff for cutting down a utility pole that the plaintiff had
erected.1 31 The pole obstructed the defendant's alley and had been erected
without his permission. 13 To regain use of the alley, the defendant removed
the pole.133 The court held that the pole's interference with the defendant's use
of the alley constituted a nuisance and that the defendant was authorized to
abate that nuisance. 134 Because the defendant committed "no breach of the
peace," and because he did not harm any third35persons or their property, the
defendant was found to have acted reasonably.'

125. Id.
126. Id. at 906-07.
127. Id. at 907 (distinguishing the defendant's actions from an unjustified trespass vi et armis
and requiring a finding of damages to support a cause of action).
128. Id. Here, the scope of the privilege is defined by the violence of the horse-whipping.
129. Hubbard v. Preston, 51 N.W. 209, 210 (Mich. 1892). The trespassing dog was one of a
"large number of dogs about [the defendant's] premises, barking, quarreling, and fighting there."

Id.
130. Id.
131. Md. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ruth, 68 A. 358, 358, 360 (Md. 1907).
132. Id. at 359-60.
133. Id. The defendant was extraordinarily careful in removing the pole, by both having the
wires cut by an expert "so that they would not hurt any one," and removing the pole "by [using]
competent men in a careful manner." Id.
134. Id. at 360.
135. Id.
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Il. TRESPASS'S OUTER LIMITS

A. Trespass to Chattels and Botnet DDoS Attacks
Once dismissed as merely the "little brother of conversion, '

136

trespass to

chattels is no longer the ninety-pound weakling of property torts. Rather, it has
emerged as the preferred common-law cause of action against disruptive
network behavior. 137
Each extension of the tort into cyberspace has involved its application to
new types of DoS attacks.1 38 Courts have been remarkably consistent in
interpreting the "intermeddling" requirement of trespass to chattels to mean
"denial of service."' 39 It may not be too far of a stretch to assert that, in
to chattels to lie, there must be at least
Internet cases, for an action for trespass
140
some showing of denial of service.
It may be impossible to factually distinguish eBay from a typical zombie
botnet DDoS scenario. In both cases, a central coordinating actor makes use of
a series of remote, Internet-connected hosts to flood a target server with
unwanted traffic. 14 1 Given the similarity between the two cases, it is almost

certain that a trespass-to-chattels claim will lie against a botnet master
conducting such an attack.'4 2

However, unlike eBay, in which Bidder's Edge (BE) received at least
temporary permission from eBay to operate its web-crawling robots on eBay's
network, 143most malicious botnet masters prefer to stay hidden. 44 When
eBay began complaining of BE's constant downloads, BE began shifting its

search-robot operations to a system of rotating prox € servers to make it more
difficult to trace the activity to the originating host. However, because eBay
136. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at § 14.
137. See supra Part I1.A.
138. See supra Part ll.A.2.a.i-iii.
139. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
that the damages included "system unavailability"); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that the high volume of junk e-mail ensured
that server resources were "not available to serve ... subscribers"); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that repeated robotic dialing "den[ied] ...

subscribers access").
140. See supra note 58-60 and accompanying text.
141. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-63; supra notes 13-15 & 72 and accompanying text.
142. Cf eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-72.
143. Id. at 1062.
144. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, THE STORM WORM, reprinted in SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
256-59 (2008). The decentralized structure of peer-to-peer botnets, such as Storm, makes it
extremely difficult to identify the botnet master. In such a botnet, certain zombies also act as
redundant command-and-control relays; therefore, the inability to identify any single commandand-control node means that, to disrupt such a botnet, a counter-striker would necessarily have to
act against individual zombie computers. See id.
145. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-63.
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remained in contact with BE, eBay could at least identify BE's robots as the
probing force
without necessarily having to resort to complicated traceback
146
methods.

In the case of a zombie botnet, however, the only contact an affected
network may have with the botnet is the flood of traffic originating from the
botnet zombies. 47 Under those circumstances, it would be extremely difficult
to track the
botnet's master and make him a party to an action for trespass to
48
1
chattels.
B. Criticisms of the Trespass-to-ChattelsTheoryfor Denial of Service: Is
Cybernuisancethe Answer?
Several commentators have suggested that common-law nuisance, rather
than trespass 49to chattels, provides a better analytical framework for spam and
DoS attacks. 1

Professor Dan Burk, the principal proponent of cybemuisance, attacks the
"incongruity between common law trespass to chattels and the problem of
spain" by focusing on the courts' willingness to read strict-liability realproperty trespass rules into trespass-to-chattels claims for spam. 150 He notes
that the "particulate trespass" cases used to support the holding in Thrifty-Tel
involved trespass to land, rather than trespass to chattels.'15 This elision of
real-property and personal-property trespass doctrines, he argues, "collaps[es]
the separate doctrines of trespass to land and trespass to chattels back into their
single common law progenitor,"
creating a hybrid cause of action "unknown to
' 52
modem jurisprudence."
Focusing on the dispossession element of trespass to chattels, he notes that
the owners of the computer equipment in Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe were not

146. Id.
147. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. The problems here are as much
jurisdictional as technical; however, questions of Intemet jurisdiction are outside the scope of this
Comment.
149. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27,
53-54 (2000) (arguing that nuisance is the best way to address the unique qualities of
cyberspace); Adam Mossoff, Spam--Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625, 64654 (2004) (arguing that spammers are guilty of nuisances as the harm spam causes is substantial).
But see John Edward Sharp, Comment, There Oughta Be a Law: Crafting Effective Weapons in
the War Against Spyware, 43 Hous. L. REV. 879, 920-21 (2007) (noting that advocates for
nuisance as a cause of action against cyberattackers "arrive[d] too late," because "computer
trespass is already making inroads as a cause of action").
150. Burk, supra note 149, at 33.
151. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Ct. App. 1996)
(discussing particulate trespass cases and holding that "the electronic signals generated by
[defendant's] activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action"); Burk,
supra note 149, at 33-34 (discussing "'particulate trespass' cases relied upon in Thrifty-Tel').
152. Burk, supra note 149, at 33.
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dispossessed of their equipment.153 Because courts finding for plaintiffs in
cyber trespass-to-chattels cases have found that the plaintiffs' computers had
been interfered with by the collision of offending electrons, Burk contends that
courts following the rules in Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe have begun to protect
54

a previously unrecognized interest in the inviolability of personal property.1
The imposition of such an exclusionary property rule, however, would allow
network users to maintain their connections with a wider network while
simultaneously entitling them to compel outside network users to negotiate for
licenses to access their internal systems. 155 The pervasive "propertization" of
Internet connectivity, argues Burk, would "tend to exacerbate rather than solve

any problem of external costs," imposing significant transaction costs on
Internet users.156

153. Id. at 34 (noting that trespass to chattels requires dispossession or other interference, and
the computers in Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe handled the flow of electrons as designed).
154. Id. at 33-34. Burk's observation flows from the very massless and insubstantial nature
of the electrons themselves, although he professes to "resist the temptation to delve into a
philosophical discourse about the comparative tangibility of electrons."
Id. at 33. The
CompuServe court, however, denied that it was dispensing with the physical contact element
finding that the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy because it had exhausted available self-help to
protect the "inviolability" of its servers from spam. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218,
cmt. e).
155. Burk, supra note 149, at 47-49. In other words, imposing the exclusionary property
rule would allow network users to maximize their benefit from Internet connectivity while
simultaneously minimizing the aggregate benefit of network connectivity to all users.
156. Id. at 51. But see Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84-85
(2003). Epstein rejects Burk's premise that the application of real property rules will necessarily
result in unmanageable "anti-commons" situations, and dismisses Burk's argument as "wrong in
all its analogies." Id. at 85. Instead, Epstein contends that "strong property rights for nonnetwork elements function as well in cyberspace as they do anywhere else." Id. at 84. Rather
than the balancing test of nuisance, Epstein contends that "[t]he missing pieces in the puzzle are
the rules on consent," or, in other words, the ability to contract. Id at 85. Taking the eBay case
as one example, Epstein praises the "level of particularization and standardization" of the
carefully drafted license between eBay and BE which, he argues, is "a great improvement over a
rule that allows one person to take the property of another until the system crashes or slows
down." Id. at 83-84. Unfortunately, Epstein neither outlines a mechanism by which these fine
allocations of rights may be negotiated among users, nor does he consider the social and network
costs involved in administering such a complex system. The Hamidi court feared such a system
would result in "a substantial reduction in the freedom of electronic communication, as the owner
of each computer through which an electronic message passes could impose its own limitations
on message content or source." Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 310 (Cal. 2003) (citing an
amicus brief by Professor Mark Lemley, who had argued that under Epstein's rule "each of the
hundreds of millions of [Internet] users must get permission in advance from anyone with whom
they want to communicate and anyone who owns a server through which their message may
travel").
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C. Attaching Liability to Botnet Zombies: Negligence
1. Scope of Zombie Liabilityfor Botnet DDoS Attacks
Given the technological and jurisdictional problems associated with both
finding botnet masters and holding them liable for DDoS attacks, a DDoSattack victim's focus necessarily turns to the possible liability of the individual
zombie hosts of a botnet. Determining whether a zombie is liable in
negligence to the victim of a DDoS attack involves defining the scope of a
zombie's possible liability. In the conventional language of courts and
commentators, the question is whether a zombie's failure to secure his
computer was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the DDoS victim.
2. Proximate Cause Problem
All botnet DDoS attacks involve at least three parties: the botnet master,
who initiates the attack; the zombie computer, from whose equipment the
attack actually emanates; and the ultimate target of the attack.157 A target
seeking to find the zombie liable immediately encounters a problem: if the
zombie-computer owner is unaware that his computer is infected, the attack
was caused by the independent, intentional act of a third party-the botnet
master.158 This presents a question of whether the DDoS attack by the botnet
master was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the zombie's failure to
prevent his own infection.159 In other words, is a zombie's failure to secure his
own computer the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the victim?
3. Majority Rule: Botnet Masters as Intervening Causes
In the majority of jurisdictions, the answer will be no. 160 Following Justice
Cardozo's reasoning in Palsgraf a DDoS victim's negligence claim will only
succeed if a zombie had a duty to prevent interference with a DDoS victim's

157. See SCHILLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 3-4 (describing the players and process involved
in a DDoS attack).
158. See Henderson & Yarborough, supra note 80, at 14.
159.

Seeid. at 17-18.

160. Cf Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Cal. 1954) (holding that the owner of an
automobile has no duty to a person injured by the acts of a third party using that automobile
unless the owner is put on notice of the third party's incompetence); Liney v. Chestnut Motors,
Inc., 218 A.2d 336, 337-38 (Pa. 1996) (stating that a defendant is not liable for a plaintiff's injury
if the cause of that injury is merely remotely connected to the defendant's actions); see also
Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300-01, 304, 306, 308 (reviewing precedent concerning computer-related tort
law, with emphasis on the intent of the actors and no mention of Internet providers being liable to
the injured subscribers). But see Henderson & Yarborough, supra note 80, at 14 (dismissing the
element of causation in negligence as "unlikely to be unusually contentious" when applied to
botnet zombies). The very nature of negligence law in the United States, however, makes it likely
that proximate cause, a sub-element of causation, will be at least reasonably contentious. See
supra Part III.C.I-2.
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computer system.' 61 Absent such a specific duty, the majority of jurisdictions
Other
would find that a victim had no correlative right to recovery. 16

jurisdictions will look at the events, from the defendant's alleged negligence to
the harm caused to the plaintiff,63and will hold that the act of a third party
necessarily breaks that sequence.'

The majority of jurisdictions would also absolve zombies of liability for the
harm actually caused by botnet masters because zombies have no duty to
control the actions of third persons, 164 nor would they need to worry about the
intentional actions of a third person that might gain control of their
is founded on a lack of a duty
computer.165 In each case, the denial of liability
66
giving rise to a correlative right to a remedy.
4. Minority Rule: Zombies Liablefor Zombie-CreatedHazards

The minority position-the modem trend-is moving away from the rigidity
of the majority's right/duty rule for proximate cause, and looks instead to the
risks that an actor creates at the time of his allegedly negligent conduct; thus,
the ultimate question is not whether an intervening cause cut off the actor's
liability. 67 Rather, there are two questions to be answered: first, did the

actor's negligence enable the third party to cause the harm for which the
plaintiff is seeking recovery; and second, if the actor's negligence did enable
the third party to cause 16harm,
was it reasonably foreseeable that the third party
8
would cause that harm.

161. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (N.Y. 1928).
162. See, e.g., Richards, 271 P.2d at 26-27; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337-38.
163. See Ross v. Nutt, 203 N.E.2d 118, 120 (S.D. Ohio 1964) (finding that the thief s actions
were an intervening cause cutting off defendant's liability); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 440 cmt. b ("[I]f in looking back from the harm and tracing the sequence of events by
which it was produced, it is found that a superseding cause has operated, there is no need of
determining whether the actor's antecedent conduct was or was not a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm."); id. § 442(d) (noting that "the fact that the operation of the intervening
force is due to a third person's act or his failure to act" is a factor in considering "whether an
intervening force is a superseding cause of harm").
164. See, e.g., Richards, 271 P.2d at 27 (noting that "in the absence of a special relationship
between the parties, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him
from causing harm to another").
165. See, e.g., Richards, 271 P.2d at 26; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337-38.
166. See, e.g., Richards, 271 P.2d at 27; Liney, 218 A.2d at 338.
167. Compare Nutt, 203 N.E.2d at 120 (finding that the actions of a third party cut off the
chain of causation even when the defendant may have also been liable), with Ross v. Hartman,
139 F.2d 14, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (finding liability when actor creates the risk of harm),
Mellish v. Cooney, 183 A.2d 753, 753-54 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962) (finding liability where the
owner of an object capable of inflicting injury is careless, leaving a substantial risk of injury), and
Maloney v. Kaplan, 135 N.E. 838, 839 (N.Y. 1922) (finding a duty in a driver to secure his
vehicle to prevent anticipated third parties from using the vehicle to injure others).
168. See, e.g., Hartman, 139 F.2d at 15-16; Mellish, 183 A.2d at 754; Maloney, 135 N.E. at
839-40; see also Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 634-35 (Minn.
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Applying these concepts to zombie botnets, these questions become: first,
did a zombie, in failing to secure his computer, enable the botnet master to use
that same computer to launch a DDoS attack; and, if so, was it reasonably
foreseeable to the zombie that a third party might take control of his computer
and launch a DDoS attack? If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then
the damage caused by the botnet master in a DDoS attack
using the zombie
1 69
computer is not outside the scope of the zombie's liability.
For the answer to the second question-whether it was foreseeable to the
zombie that his failure to take adequate precautions would enable a botnet
master to take control of his computer-a victim seeking to establish the
liability of a zombie would have to point to the state of network security
generally; perhaps the most dramatic measure of the foreseeability of the
breach of an otherwise unsecured computer is its "survival time." 170 Survival
time is defined as the average time between a computer's first connection to
the Internet and its being compromised by a remote exploit. 171 For users of the
most dominant operating system in the market, Microsoft Windows, the
survival-time statistics are grim: as of this writing, the survival time of an
Internet-connected computer running the latest version of Microsoft's
operating system is quoted at "around 4 minutes. ' 72 Given this speed, an
unprotected computer is likely to be compromised, and fairly quickly.
D. Striking Back against a Zombie DDoS Attack: Privileges
1. Actions against Bot Herders

Despite some misgivings among network administrators, it would appear
that reasonable counterstrikes against botnet masters would be afforded a
complete privilege. Indeed, the CompuServe court suggested that the use of
"reasonable force" provided "sufficient legal protection" to a DDoS victim's

1978) (noting that the emphasis in Minnesota had switched to determining whether the third
party's conduct was reasonably foreseeable).
169. The answer to the first question is easily ascertainable: any indication of repetitive,
automated traffic, particularly traffic structured specifically to consume as many server resources
as possible, would indicate a DDoS attack in progress. See SCHILLER ET AL., supra note 8, at
144-50.
170. Loma Hutcheson, Survival Time on the Internet, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=
4721 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). "Survival time" statistics are kept by the SANS Internet Storm
Center, which provides early detection and warning services to Internet Service Providers. SANS
Internet Storm Center, About the Internet Storm Center, http://isc.sans.org/about.html [hereinafter
SANS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
171. See Hutcheson, supra note 170; see also SANS, supranote 170.
172. Hutcheson, supra note 170.
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court explicitly
interest in the condition of his servers. 173 Indeed, the 1same
74
recognized a "privilege to protect ... computer systems."
2. Actions against Zombies
A privilege for self-help against individual zombie computers, however, is
not as straightforward as self-help against botnet masters. However, it is a
more defensible option if the victim can attach liability to the zombies.
Even if zombies are themselves not liable, a victim may conceivably invoke
the privilege of private necessity, which privileges actions taken "to prevent
serious harm to the actor, his land or chattels.' 17§ However, private necessity
possibly
only affords a partial privilege, with the counterstriking party being
176
liable to the zombie for excessive harm to the zombie's computer.
IV. UNLEASHING THE CURE: HOLDING ZOMBIES LIABLE FOR THE
VULNERABILITY OF THEIR COMPUTERS

A. The Casefor Negligence
Because of the conceptual difficulties of adapting trespass or nuisance to
"intangible" property, the negligence doctrine might provide us with a more
attractive framework for assigning liability. Unlike trespass to chattels or
to strike at zombies
cybernuisance, negligence allows a botnet-attack victim
177
directly, while avoiding needlessly artificial pleading.

173. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, cmt. e).
174. Id. (recognizing plaintiff's actions as "attempt[s] to exercise [legal] privilege to protect
its [servers]").
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965); see also Smith, supra note 18, at
191-92.

176. Smith, supra note 18, at 191-93 (citing Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W.2d
221, 222 (Minn. 1910)). Because the general requirement is that self-help be "reasonable," the
partial privilege of private necessity may not be all that different from the theoretically "total"
privileges of defense of property and nuisance abatement. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 218 (defense of property), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 264 (privilege to
interfere with chattels to abate private nuisance), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197
(private necessity). See also supra Part II.C (discussing privileges to tortious interferences with
personal property). Even in defense of property or abatement of nuisance, liability may be
incurred if an actor exceeds the scope of the privilege; once exceeded, the actor is liable to the
extent of the excess. See Slater v. Swann, (1865) 93 Eng. Rep. 906, 907 (K.B.). Thus, should the
parties in a given transaction litigate, the limited compensation due to one whose property
interests are invaded under the doctrine of private necessity is functionally identical to the
compensation owed to one who is harmed by another who exceeds a privilege to commit harm.
Either doctrine allocates resources as among the two parties in exactly the same way.
177. See infra note 184.
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1. Negligence, Not Trespass
Both Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe found claims for trespass to chattels
viable in DoS contexts.1 78 By permitting plaintiffs to claim trespass for the
mere impact of massless electrons upon their servers, a heightened
cybertrespass rule raises the specter of a digital "anti-commons," in which
individual Internet users regulate access to their servers in ever more restrictive
ways, driving up transaction costs for legitimate actors. 179 Moreover, a
cybertrespass regime would not allow botnet DDoS victims to bring actions
against individual zombies unless the victim could show intent .by the zombie
to interfere with the functioning of the victim's computer server.
2. Negligence, Not Nuisance
Cybernuisance is an attractive potential cause of action for network-based
wrongs because situations involving spam and DDoS attacks typically involve
an actor's imposition of either a "tremendous burden" upon a victim's servers
or an unreasonable demand upon a victim's services.' 81 These situations are
more appropriately dealt with using a harms-benefits analysis.1 82 However,
just as the court in Thrifty-Tel conflated trespasses to real property and
personal property, 183 cybernuisance proponents urge the imposition of realproperty rules to personal property. 84 But we need not go through such
178. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1017; Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
468, 471-73 (Ct. App. 1996).
179. See Burk, supra note 149, at 49-50 (describing "anti-commons" as a situation where
"rights become so finely divided that it becomes impossible to conduct any type of business");
see also Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL.
L. REv. 439, 512 (2003) (warning that "[i]f we continue to mark out anticommons claims in
cyberspace, not only will we preclude better, more innovative uses of cyberspace resources, but
we will lose sight of what might be possible").
180. See supra Parts III.A-B.
181. eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal, 2000) (finding
that the use of automatic web-crawling robots on a publicly-accessible website where automated
access is prohibited exceeds the scope of consent and may be an actionable trespass to chattels);
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
182. Burk, supranote 149, at 53.
183. See Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6 (discussing particulate trespass cases and
holding that "the electronic signals generated by the [defendant's] activities were sufficiently
tangible to support a trespass cause of action"); see also Burk, supra note 149, at 33 (discussing
the particulate trespass cases relied upon in Thrifty-Tel and the court's merger of real-property
concepts with personal-property concepts).
184. See Burk, supra note 149, at 53-54. In defense of his proposed cybernuisance cause of
action, Burk declares himself untroubled by the distinction between real and personal property
because "this property distinction has proven no obstacle to courts thus far." Id. at 53. Another
proponent of cybemuisance attempts to solve this dilemma by connecting a business's interest in
the profitable functioning of its computers with its property interest in its physical premises,
equating a business's computers with, among other things, a farmer's herds. See Mossoff, supra
note 149, at 658-66. Regardless of its theoretical value, a cybernuisance cause of action would
add more artificial pleading to Internet tort cases.
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mental contortions to arrive at a rule that governs the unreasonable use of
personal property because a cause of action already governs the creation of
unreasonable hazards-negligence.
Negligence can, without further extension, do double duty. It can free us of
the artificial pleading required by trespass-to-chattels claims on the one hand,
and allow us to impose liability upon botnet zombies on the other.
3. ForcingZombies to Internalize the Costs of their (In)Action
Adopting negligence also has a number of important economic benefits.
Cost-benefit analyses of computer security have tended to focus on costs and
benefits to the actor taking the precaution, rather than any effects on the
security or functioning of the network as a whole. 185 Imposing a duty to
prevent infections on zombie-computer owners, whether by applying the
reasonable-foreseeability test or by establishing continuing control over the
computer, would shift the costs from the innocent victims of botnet DDoS
attacks to computer owners, whose unprotected computers actually caused the
damage.186 Eventually, the distribution of these costs to zombies would create
a powerful incentive for computer owners to avoid liability by increasing the
security of their own computers and networks, is7 which would increase the

185.

See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software

Security, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 310-11 (2006) ("[A] user will invest in preventative
measures (spending X) when those investments reduce expected costs (losses plus administrative
costs) by enough to offset the investment: pL + pC > X + qL + qC."). Under this model, for the
additional cost of greater security to be economically rational, the potential damage to the user's
own system, multiplied by the probability of that damage actually occurring must be greater than
the cost of the additional precaution, itself multiplied by the lowered probability of loss. This is
the same cost-benefit analysis employed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). This standard model fails to account for the type
of harm that results from a botnet attack, where the individual zombie suffers little harm, but is
itself the means by which a third party can cause harm to a target computer system.
186. Costs include the damage suffered during denial of service, plus other damages not
usually actionable under trespass to chattels: lost productivity, lost sales, and other opportunity
costs. Even if consequential damages are limited by aHamidi-likerule, the imposition of liability
on individual botnet zombies would allow botnet victims to shift at least their direct DoS costsbandwidth, disk space, and so on--onto the zombies. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300
(Cal. 2003) (denying recovery for consequential damages claimed to have been incurred as a
result of the defendant's cyber actions).
187. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIABILITY AND SECURITY (2004), reprinted in SCHNEIER ON
SECURITY, supra note 144, at 152-54. Schneier envisions a role for the insurance industry as a
clearinghouse for risk: "[O]nce the CEO starts buying security products based on his insurance
premiums, the insurance industry will wield enormous power in the marketplace.... And since
the insurance companies pay for the actual liability, they have a great incentive to be rational
about risk analysis and the effectiveness of security products." Id. at 153.
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security of the Internet as a188whole: "(e]nforce liability, and everything else
will flow from it. It has to."'
B. Two Ways to FightZombies
1. In Majority Jurisdictions:Creatinga ContinuingDuty of Care to Other
Network Users

A majority of jurisdictions present the botnet victim with the problem of
establishing proximate cause. Although the DDoS makes use of the zombie
computer, the attack is not directed by the zombie himself. A botnet victim
must somehow distinguish his case from the parked car cases and establish
some kind
of correlative right/duty relationship that would give rise to a
1 89
remedy.

A closer examination of the facts common to all parked car cases, however,
reveals a few critical distinctions between those cases and DDoS botnet
attacks. In parked car cases, the owner of the car left his car unattended, which
allowed a third-party thief to enter and dispossess the owner of his car.190 In
each case, the owner of the car did not have possession or control of the car at
the time that the thief caused harm to the plaintiff.1 91
The presence of the botnet software on a zombie, however, is a minor, but
continuing, interference with the zombie's property right. In most cases, the
zombie computer continues to function while the zombie computer owner
continues to use it. In other words, although the computer may be in the thrall
188. Id. at 154. Although Schneier's main concern is for the absolute security of the
individual network host, he describes the same negative externality problem that permits botnet
zombies to flourish:
[M]ost organizations don't spend a lot of money on network security. Why? Because
the costs are significant: time expense, reduced functionality, frustrated end users. On
the other hand, the costs of ignoring security and getting hacked are small: the
possibility of bad press and angry customers, maybe some network downtime, none of
which is permanent .... The result: a smart organization does what everyone else
does, and no more.
Id.at 152.
He notes, approvingly, a judicial order that required the U.S. Department of the Interior to take
its website offline until the department could guarantee the safety of its data. Id.at 153. Schneier
concludes that once liabilities are enforced, parties will avoid liability under a least-cost avoider
theory-upgrading individual computer security. Id.at 154.
189. See supra Part l.B.2.a.
190. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23,
24-25 (Cal. 1954); Mellish v. Cooney, 183 A.2d 753, 753 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1962); Maloney v.
Kaplan, 135 N.E. 838, 839 (N.Y. 1922); Ross v. Nutt, 203 N.E.2d 118, 120 (Ohio 1964); Liney v.
Chestnut Motors, Inc., 218 A.2d 336, 337 (Pa. 1966); McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767,
769 (Tenn. 1991).
191. Hartman, 139 F.2d at 14; Richards, 271 P.2d at 25; Mellish, 183 A.2d at 753; Maloney,
135 N.E. at 839; Nutt, 203 N.E.2d at 120; Liney, 218 A.2d at 337; McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at
769.
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of a botnet master, it is never wholly out of the control of its owner. A
networked computer, in other words, is less like a parked car, 192 and more like
a car on the highway. 93 Because the zombie owner is still in control and
possession of his computer, the argument for liability is stronger.
2. In Minority Jurisdictions:Towards a Duty to Avoid Harm to Other
Network Users
Fortunately for botnet victims, under the minority rule, a botnet DDoS
victim need only concern himself with the zombie's duty of care found in
Justice Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf194 Under the theory endorsed in this
Comment, to establish zombie liability for a botnet DDoS attack, one must
show that a zombie: (1) failed to take reasonable precautions against infection;
(2) as a result of the failure to take adequate precautions, the zombie was
infected; (3) as a result of the infection, the zombie actually caused the harm of
the DDoS; and (4) it was reasonably foreseeable to the zombie that failure to
secure his computer would result in the harm. Given the size and prevalence
of botnets, and the speed at which computers may be compromised, it does not
seem unreasonable to assert that zombies may be found liable according to this
theory.

192. A parked car is not under its owner's control. See, e.g., Richards, 271 P.2d at 27
(noting, in a parked car case, that the defendant "has relinquished control of his property to the
third person").
193. The owners of cars operated on public highways are generally presumed to be in control
of their vehicle. Even when not directly in control of their vehicle, owners have generally been
found to owe a duty of reasonable care as to the maintenance of their vehicles, lest they become
hazards to other road users. See, e.g., Prosser v. Glass, 481 So.2d 365, 368 (Ala. 1985) ("The
operator of a motor vehicle on public highways has a duty to see that the automobile is in
reasonably good condition so as not to present a source of danger to others."); Levitt v.
Hammonds, 628 N.E.2d 280, 283 (I11.App. Ct. 1993) (finding that maintaining a vehicle's brakes
is the responsibility of the operator, and may also be the responsibility of the owner); Shelmire v.
Linton, 343 So.2d 301, 305 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("Any failure on [defendant's] part to use
ordinary care to prevent mechanical malfunction is likewise negligent conduct."); Naumenko v.
Burrell, 365 A.2d 718, 719-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that defendant could not
excuse himself from liability for operating a vehicle with defective brakes if "he offered not a
shred of excuse for driving the car in such a vitally defective condition"); Prevette v. Bullis, 183
S.E.2d 810, 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) ("It is the duty of a motorist operating a motor vehicle on a
public highway to exercise reasonable care to see that it is in reasonably good condition and
properly equipped, so that it may not become a source of danger to its occupants or to other
travelers."). Thus, because a zombie computer remains at least in part under the control of its
owner, then its owner has a continuing duty not to allow his property to harm that of another. On
the highway, the duty is breached by a failure to properly maintain one's car; on the Internet, the
duty would be breached by a failure to maintain adequate control over one's own computer.
194. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
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C. Effects of a Duty to PreventInfection: Creatinga Privilege to Disrupt
Botnets

Establishing liability for individual zombie hosts would also allow botnet
DDoS victims to strike back aggressively and disrupt available botnets without
fear of liability.1 95 It should be stressed, however, that the privilege proposed
is limited to reasonable counterstrikes only, and the reasonableness of any
counterstrike would depend on the facts in that particular situation. 96 By
extending immunity from tort liability to reasonable counterstrikes, we would
encourage more efforts to disrupt and destroy existing botnets. Armed with the
technical ability to destroy a botnet, researchers should not have to cower in
fear at the ability of a zombie to impose tort liability for an action that, 1in97the
final analysis, increases the security and safety of the network as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION

A viable theory of liability, grounded in common-law negligence, affords
botnet-attack victims two ways to fight back against their zombie aggressors:
litigation and self-help. Imposing negligence liability would change user
behavior, making botnet infections less likely. Recognizing a counterstrike
privilege protects and rewards actors who develop ways to destroy existing
botnets and protect network computing assets.

The combination of the

imposition of liability on botnet zombies and the creation of the counterstrike

195. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
196. Subjecting counterstrikes to a standard of reasonableness necessarily means that courts
will have to examine whether a given counterstrike is reasonable in the particular circumstances
under which it is launched. Nevertheless, I can suggest a number of situations where a
counterstrike might be considered presumptively reasonable. A reasonable counterstrike should
exploit a vulnerability on a zombie computer of which the zombie's owner is, or reasonably
should be, aware. Additionally, the counterstrike should only attack a vulnerability for which a
fix has been issued-the zombie owner should have had at least a reasonable opportunity to
become aware of the fix and to apply it. If counterstrikes exploiting well-known vulnerabilities
are presumptively reasonable, and thus privileged, botnet victims would have an even more
powerful incentive to attempt to disrupt the connections of zombie computers whose owners have
failed to take even minimal steps to secure them. Cf Henderson & Yarborough, supra note 80, at
21 (suggesting a standard of care for network-connected computers). For example, suppose there
exists a well-known flaw in a computer operating system that allows a remote user to execute
programs on the target system, without the owner of the target system being aware of any unusual
activity. Suppose again that the developers of the operating system are aware of this flaw and
have made available to the operating system's users a means to correct that flaw. If a reasonable
time has passed between the issuance of the fix, and if the reasonable user would have become
aware that a fix was available, then it is equally reasonable for such a user to have applied the fix
to his operating system, closing the well-known vulnerability. If a user had not applied the fix,
and his computer had become a zombie node as a result of that omission, then it should be
presumptively reasonable for a counterstriking botnet DDoS victim to make use of the same
vulnerability to destroy the botnet, or disrupt its operations.
197. See supra note 7.
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privilege creates powerful incentives to halt the spread and disrupt the growth
of malicious botnets.
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